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文献速递—产业创新生态系统中利益相关者战略协同进化机制

数字经济创新研究院 66

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中文题目:再生资源产业创新生态系统中利益相关者战略的协同进化机制:进化博弈论观点,英文题目:The coevolution mechanism of stakeholder strategies in the recycled resources industry innovation ecosystem: the view of evolutionary game theory,

摘要:再生资源产业被认为是可持续发展的支柱之一。尽管这是RRI面临的困境之一,但迄今为止很少有研究评估RRI的创新机制。因此,在进化博弈模型中包括“政府”、“企业”和“大学研究所”,本文借鉴创新生态系统理论,进行机制分析,以阐明区域创新中利益相关者战略的进化稳定性。研究结果突出了六种潜在的进化稳定策略,可以实现“理想状态”。此外,在有补贴政策和没有补贴政策的情况下,参与者的战略选择具有不同的相互依存性,识别了分歧因素和对主要利益相关者的影响机制,并发现了影响的传递效应。此外,当补贴配额在适当范围内时,补贴政策将促进这些利益相关者之间的积极合作。本文从利益相关者的角度解构了演化机制黑箱,从而更清楚地理解了产业创新生态系统的演化动力学。这些关键发现还为决策者提供了证据,以促进创新生态系统中主体的共同进化,从而提高区域创新体系的整体创新能力。

Abstract: The recycled resources industry (RRI) is considered one of the pillars for sustainable development. Few studies to date have evaluated the innovation regime in RRI, although it is one of the dilemmas that RRI is facing. Therefore, including “Government,” “Enterprise,” and “University-Research institute” in the evolutionary game model, this paper draws on innovation ecosystem theory and conducts a mechanism analysis to clarify the evolutionary stability of stakeholder strategies in the RRI. The findings highlight six potential Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS), with which the ‘ideal state’ can be achieved. Moreover, with and without the subsidy policy, the strategic choices of players are differently interdependent, the divergent factors and the influencing mechanisms to the main stakeholders are identified, and the transmission effect of the influence is found. What's more, a subsidy policy would promote active cooperation between these stakeholders when the subsidy quota is within an appropriate range. This paper unpacks the evolution mechanism black box from the stakeholders’ perspective, which provides a clearer understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of industrial innovation ecosystems. The critical findings also provide evidence for policymakers to facilitate the coevolution of the agents in the innovation ecosystem, thereby improving the overall innovation ability of the RRI.

来源期刊:Technological Forecasting and Social Change,2022年

参考文献格式:Xinyu Hao, Guangfu Liu, Xiaoling Zhang, Liang Dong,The coevolution mechanism of stakeholder strategies in the recycled resources industry innovation ecosystem: the view of evolutionary game theory,Technological Forecasting and Social Change,Volume 179,2022,121627,ISSN 0040-1625,.

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