期刊简介

《冲突解决杂志》（Journal of Conflict Resolution）是一份关于人类冲突的社会科学研究和理论的跨学科杂志。该杂志主要关注国际冲突，但也探讨了各种国家、群体间和人际冲突。该期刊2022年的影响因子为3.211。

本期目录

1

中伤言语：战场活动对冲突谈判行为的影响

Painful Words：The Effect of Battlefield Activity on Conflict Negotiation Behavior

2

“双重公民”：军事优越感如何削弱美国的文官控制

“Twice the Citizen”：How Military Attitudes of Superiority Undermine Civilian Control in the United States

3

外国强加政权更迭的原因：经济征用的信号

Causes of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change：The Signal of Economic Expropriation

4

反对化学武器的两幅面孔：真诚与虚伪的规范认同者

The Two Faces of Opposition to Chemical Weapons：Sincere Versus Insincere Norm-Holders

5

为什么领导者要筑墙？国内政治、领袖生存与边境防御

Why Do Leaders Build Walls? Domestic Politics, Leader Survival, and The Fortification of Borders

6

国家安全还是剥削：军事参与经济的理论

State Security or Exploitation：A Theory of Military Involvement in the Economy

7

随机和战略不确定性下的低效合作

Inefficient Cooperation Under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty

8

语言能促进和解吗？来自前南斯拉夫的证据

Does Language Foster Reconciliation? Evidence From the Former Yugoslavia

9

竞争与平民受害

Competition and Civilian Victimization

10

意识形态模糊性对恐怖组织的影响

The Impact of Ideological Ambiguity on Terrorist Organizations

11

移民对同族政治支持的影响：来自土耳其的证据

The Effect of Migration on Political Support for Co-ethnics: Evidence From Turkey

文章摘要

中伤言语：战场活动对冲突谈判行为的影响

题目：Painful Words: The Effect of Battlefield Activity on Conflict Negotiation Behavior

作者：Eric Min，加州大学洛杉矶分校政治学副教授，研究兴趣为国家间战争与外交的关联以及国际安全和冲突管理。

摘要：在战时谈判中，战场活动如何影响交战各方的行为？虽然学者们研究了交战各方选择谈判的时间和原因，但很少有人能解释谈判者坐到谈判桌前会做什么。通过分析朝鲜战争的所有谈判记录和相关的每日军事行动报告，作者认为，当遭受有争议且不确定的敌对行为时，行为体会采取顽固的谈判行为表明决心。通过利用基于文本、机器学习以及统计的方法，结果表明，孤立地看，高强度的军事活动或大规模伤亡会分别产生关于未来趋势的明确信息，从而产生更多实质性的谈判；然而若上述的高强度军事活动或大量伤亡接连出现，则会产生愤世嫉俗式的无效谈判。通过回顾过去的当代文献，本研究探讨了冲突和外交的微观动态，在两种长期存在的谈判观点之间搭建了理论桥梁，并通过将计算方法应用于档案文件，为研究战争提供了一个框架。

How does battlefield activity affect belligerents’ behavior during wartime negotiations? While scholars have studied when and why warring parties choose to negotiate, few insights explain what negotiators do once seated at the table. I argue that actors engage in obstinate negotiation behavior to signal resolve when undergoing contentious and indeterminate hostilities. I explore this claim by analyzing all negotiation transcripts and associated daily military operations reports from the Korean War. Using text-based, machine learning, and statistical methods, I show that high levels of movement or casualties in isolation produce clear information on future trends, thus yielding more substantive negotiations, while more turbulent activity featuring high movement and casualties in tandem produces cynical negotiations. Moving past contemporary literature, this study explores micro-level dynamics of conflict and diplomacy, builds a theoretical bridge between two perennial views of negotiation, and provides a framework for studying war by applying computational methods to archival documents.

“双重公民”：军事优越感如何削弱美国的文官控制

题目：“Twice the Citizen”: How Military Attitudes of Superiority Undermine Civilian Control in the United States

作者：Risa Brooks，马凯特大学政治学教授，战略与国际研究中心国际安全项目非常驻高级研究员，研究兴趣包括国际安全与安全研究、美国和比较军政关系、政治暴力和激进组织、中东和北非地区等；Sharan Grewal，威廉与玛丽学院政府学副教授，布鲁金斯学会非常驻研究员，中东民主项目非常驻高级研究员，研究兴趣包括民主化、安全研究和阿拉伯世界的政治伊斯兰，特别是埃及和突尼斯。

摘要：文官对军队的控制是制定安全政策的核心，确保了民选领导人及其任命的文职官员能够监督并决定军事事务。本文揭示了美国文官控制面临的挑战，这种挑战源于军事人员对文官社会的蔑视态度。作者认为，当军事人员认为军事文化优越时，他们更有可能认为文官政治领导人不合法，进而支持削弱文官控制的行动。本文开发了一种文官控制的类型，使得军官可以约束、争夺和限制文官权威。实证分析部分通过三项针对美国军事人员的调查（1998-99年TISS对2901名军官的调查、2014年YouGov对275名老兵的调查以及2020年对770名西点军校学员的原始调查）提供了强有力和一致的证据，证明军官优越感对文官控制的损害作用。

Civilian control of the military is central to the making of security policy, ensuring that civilian officials and the elected leaders that appoint them oversee and decide military affairs. This paper exposes a challenge to civilian control in the United States that originates in the disparaging attitudes military personnel hold toward civilian society. We argue that when military personnel view military culture as superior, they are more likely to view civilian political leaders as illegitimate and in turn to favor actions that undermine civilian control. We develop a typology of civilian control in which military officers can constrain, contest and limit civilian authority. Our empirical analysis provides strong and consistent evidence of the corrosive effects of military superiority on civilian control across three surveys of U.S. military personnel: the 1998-99 TISS survey of 2901 military officers, a 2014 YouGov of 275 veterans, and an original 2020 survey of 770 West Point cadets.

外部强加政权更迭的原因：经济征用的信号

题目：Causes of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change: The Signal of Economic Expropriation

作者：Danielle Vill，埃默里大学政治学博士候选人，研究兴趣为冲突管理与冲突动态；Daniel Arnon，亚利桑那大学政府与公共政策学院副教授，研究兴趣为个人与国家之间的冲突过程，包括个人对国家的暴力（恐怖主义和叛乱），以及国家对个人的暴力（侵犯人权和镇压）；Dan Reiter，埃默里大学塞缪尔·坎德勒·多布斯政治学教授，研究兴趣包括国际和国内冲突的原因和结果、国内和国际政治之间的联系、定量方法和国际关系、国际联盟、决策、美国外交政策等。

摘要：为什么大国试图进行外部强加政权更迭(FIRC)?建立在现有安全理论的基础上，本文认为大国会寻找一个政府可能退出其国际等级制度和/或进入对手的国际等级制度的信号。大国更有可能对那些发出偏好转变信号的国家实施外部强加政权更迭。本文用1947年至1989年期间美国进行外部强加政权更迭的尝试来检验该理论，这些尝试或隐蔽或公开，或成功或失败。在此基础上，本文提出当一个等级制度中的成员国或中立国开始经济征用时，标志着其可能退出美国等级制度和/或进入苏联等级制度，美国外部强加政权更迭就更可能针对这个国家。文章还提出了另一种理论，即经济特殊利益推动了美国外部强加政权更迭的尝试。通过利用经济征用方面的新数据，本文支持现有安全理论，即美国等级制度成员国的经济征用使外部强加政权更迭的尝试更有可能发生，但本文的结果并不支持特殊利益理论。

Why do major powers attempt foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC)? This article builds on existing security theory, proposing that a major power looks for signals that a government might exit that major power’s international hierarchy and/or enter an adversary’s hierarchy. Major powers are more likely to attempt FIRC against states that signal shifting preferences. The article tests the theory on American FIRC attempts from 1947 to 1989, covert and overt, failed and successful, proposing that when a hierarchy member or neutral state engaged in economic expropriation, this signaled possible exit from the US hierarchy and/or entry into the Soviet hierarchy, making a US FIRC attempt against that state more likely. It also presents an alternative theory, that economic special interests drove US FIRC attempts. Using new data on expropriations, the article supports the security theory, as expropriations by US hierarchy members made FIRC attempts more likely, but does not support the special interests theory.

反对化学武器的两幅面孔：真诚与虚伪的准则制定者

题目：The Two Faces of Opposition to Chemical Weapons: Sincere Versus Insincere Norm-Holders

作者：Christopher W. Blair，普林斯顿大学政治系讲师，研究兴趣为冲突与移民的政治经济；Jonathan A. Chu，新加坡国立大学李光耀公共政策学院国际事务助理教授兼总统青年教授，研究兴趣为全球舆论、身份和规范对战争政治、民主和大国政治的影响；Joshua A. Schwartz，麻省理工学院博士后，圣母大学汉斯·摩根索研究员，研究兴趣为领导人和公众成员支持使用军事力量的原因，以及应用军事力量的条件与有效性。

摘要：著名研究认为，使用大规模杀伤性武器是禁忌。但这些规范有多深入人心呢?通过对这一问题的民调，作者认为，一些公民实际上在私底下支持这些禁用武器政策，但由于害怕社会制裁，不愿意公开表达反规范的意见。这些不诚实的规范认同者很难被经验识别，因为他们看起来等同于诚实的规范认同者。为了克服这一挑战，本文设计特定列表，允许调查对象间接表达敏感的意见。三个列表实验的结果显示，当被直接问及使用化学武器时，10%到17%的美国人会伪造他们的偏好。另外，作者探索了在核武器和精英行为领域的框架。本文的研究结果推动了一场关于武器禁忌认同程度的具体辩论，而文章对不诚实的规范认同者的概念化和方法论应用对学者们如何思考和衡量国际政治中的规范具有更广泛的影响。

Prominent research holds that the use of weapons of mass destruction is taboo. But how strong are these norms? Investigating this question among the mass public, we argue that some citizens actually support taboo policies in private but are unwilling to express counter-normative opinions openly due to fear of social sanction. These insincere norm-holders are difficult to identify empirically because they are observationally equivalent to sincere norm-holders in direct-question surveys. To overcome this challenge, we use a list design, which allows survey respondents to indirectly express sensitive opinions. The results from three list experiments show that between 10% and 17% of Americans falsify their preferences over chemical weapons use when asked directly. In an extension, we explore our framework in the realm of nuclear weapons and elite behavior. Our findings advance a specific debate on the strength of weapons taboos, while our conceptualization of insincere norm-holders and methodological application have broader implications for how scholars might think about and measure norms in international politics.

为什么领导者要筑墙：国内政治、领袖生存与边境防御

题目：Why Do Leaders Build Walls? Domestic Politics, Leader Survival, and The Fortification of Borders

作者：Christopher Linebarger，麻省大学罗威尔校区犯罪学与司法研究学院副教授，研究兴趣包括内战、政治暴力、恐怖主义和安全研究；Alex Braithwaite，亚利桑那大学Melody S. Robidoux基金会基金教授，研究兴趣为暴力和非暴力冲突的原因和传播，包括恐怖主义、抗议、骚乱、内战和国际战争。

摘要：世界各国正在以前所未有的速度加强其国际边界的防御工事。在第二次世界大战结束时，只有7个国家用围墙或围栏加强了边界，而现在这一数字已增长到75个以上。为什么国家要在他们的国际边界上筑墙？虽然国家可能会用筑墙的方式来减轻跨境经济不平等的后果，并抵御跨国安全威胁，但本文认为，另一个令人信服的逻辑是国内政治和领导人希望留任的愿望。基于转移视线理论提供的假设，本文认为，面临失去权力的风险会促使国家政治领导人实施更受欢迎的政策，比如修建边境墙，希望这样做会引发国内反弹效应。为了验证这一观点，本文收集了一个全球领导人的年份数据集，发现缺乏政治安全感的领导人更有可能开始并继续修建边境墙。

States around the world are fortifying their international borders at unprecedented rates. While only seven states had fortified their borders with walls or fences as of the end of World War Two, this number has now grown to more than 75. Why do states build walls on their international borders? While states may build walls to ameliorate the consequences of cross-border economic inequalities and to defend against transnational security threats, we suggest that another compelling logic stems from domestic politics and leaders’ desire to remain in office. Building on assumptions furnished by diversionary theory, we argue that national political leaders at risk of losing office are incentivized to implement popular policies, such as border wall construction, hoping that doing so will prompt a domestic rally effect. To test this argument, we assemble a global dataset of leader-years and find that politically insecure leaders are more likely to be seen to start and continue border wall construction.

国家安全还是剥削：军事参与经济的理论

题目：State Security or Exploitation: A Theory of Military Involvement in the Economy

作者：Roya Izadi，罗德岛大学政治系副教授，研究兴趣为政治经济的安全动态、军民关系、政治暴力、安全部门改革、冲突和冲突后解决。

摘要：为什么在一些国家，军队通过经营盈利企业来介入经济？是什么导致政府允许这种介入？经营家电工厂、交通公司、银行、酒店等活动确实与国家安全无关，也与军队的常规职能相去甚远。这种参与对政治和经济都有进一步的影响。本文认为，军事介入经济的过程是领导人的一种生存策略，也是军方的一种盈利计划。本研究使用有关军事干预经济的原始跨国数据，证明当军方的制度利益受到威胁，当政府不得不依赖军方来维持权力时，军方更有可能参与经济。领导人允许军队通过经济活动获得经济利益，以便继续掌权。

Why does the military in some countries get involved in the economy by running profit-making enterprises and what leads governments to permit such involvement? Running household appliance factories, transportation agencies, banks, hotels, etc., are indeed unrelated to national security and are far removed from the regular roles assigned to militaries. Such involvement has further implications for both politics and the economy. I argue that the process of military involvement in the economy functions as a survival strategy for leaders and a profit-making scheme for the military. Using original cross-national data on the emergence of military involvement in the economy, this research demonstrates that militaries are more likely to get involved in the economy when the military’s institutional interests are at risk and when the government has to rely on the military to maintain power. Leaders allow the military to benefit financially through economic activities in order to stay in power.

随机和战略不确定性下的低效合作

题目：Inefficient Cooperation Under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty

作者：Lisa V. Bruttel，波茨坦大学经济学教授，研究兴趣为产业组织、实验和行为经济学；Werner Güth，耶拿大学经济学荣誉教授，研究兴趣为实验经济学、博弈与决策、行为经济学；Andreas Orland，波茨坦大学博士后研究员，研究兴趣为产业组织、实验经济学、行为经济学和宏观经济学。

摘要：随机不确定性可能导致协调问题，阻碍互利合作。本文提出了一种旨在规避这些协调问题的事后自愿转移机制，并寻求它是否能提高效率。为了验证这一转移机制，作者基于一个具有随机禀赋的重复性最后通牒博弈进行了受控实验室实验。与假设相反，本文发现允许自愿转移并不会导致效率的提高。本文提出并分析了这一失败的两个主要原因：第一，随机不确定性迫使有意合作的提议者接受高战略不确定性，而许多提议者回避这种不确定性;其次，许多反应者只是有条件地进行不完全的合作，阻碍了未来的合作。

Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.

语言能促进和解吗？来自前南斯拉夫的证据

题目：Does Language Foster Reconciliation? Evidence From the Former Yugoslavia

作者：Michael Kumove，挪威科技大学社会与政治系博士后，研究兴趣为语言、种族和社会信任。

摘要：尽管对冲突后和解的研究激增，但促进和解的具体因素仍然是一个争论的主题。特别是，共享语言在促进和解方面可能发挥的作用很少受到学术关注。本文探讨了共同语言促进和解的两种可能路径，并使用来自塞尔维亚的446个人的新调查数据集进行了测试。正如预期的那样，结果表明，共享语言减少了冲突对群体间信任和友谊（和解的两个重要组成部分）的负面影响。此外，研究结果表明，在前南斯拉夫，这种影响是由于共享语言在促进交流方面的作用而产生的，而不是由于它的其他特性，例如作为种族或文化特征的标志。

Despite a surge in research on post-conflict reconciliation, the specific factors which promote reconciliation remain a subject of debate. In particular, the possible role of shared language in fostering reconciliation has received little scholarly attention. This paper examines two possible channels through which shared language may facilitate reconciliation, and tests these using a new survey dataset of 446 individuals from Serbia. As expected, the results indicated that shared language reduces the negative effect of conflict on intergroup trust and friendship, two crucial components of reconciliation. Furthermore, the results suggest that in the former Yugoslavia this effect is generated by the communication-enabling aspects of a shared language, rather than its other properties such as acting as a marker of ethnic or cultural identity.

竞争与平民受害

题目：Competition and Civilian Victimization

作者：Michael Gibilisco，加利福尼亚理工学院政治学副教授，研究兴趣为正式政治理论、比较政治经济学和政治方法论；Brenton Kenkel，范德比尔特大学政治学系副教授，研究兴趣包括在国际体系和国家本身的建设过程中，国家如何构建秩序和维持权力、国家如何利用外交沟通来推进其目标，以及可能阻碍可靠信息传递的激励问题；Miguel R. Rueda，埃默里大学政治学副教授，研究兴趣为选举操纵、发展中民主国家中的客户主义与赞助机制。

摘要：在内战中对平民使用暴力被广泛认为是战斗群体的战略选择。本文认为，竞争的共同战略逻辑是各种平民受害理论的基础。本文创造了一个（平民）受害的战略补充理论，假设武装组织预期其竞争对手也会采取同样的行动，于是其迫害平民的倾向会增加。本文使用哥伦比亚内战的数据，对武装团体之间战略相互依赖的正式模型进行结构化估计，以此来检验这一论点。研究结果表明，战略预期是大量针对平民的暴力行为的原因：如果两大战斗集团没有预料到对手的暴力行为，他们会在至少9%的城市有计划地伤害平民。通过分析因果机制，我们还发现，哥伦比亚内战中的迫害行为更有可能是为了控制平民，而不是影响和平谈判。

Violence against civilians in civil war is widely thought of as a strategic choice by combatant groups. We argue that a common strategic logic of competition underlies diverse theories of civilian victimization. We develop a theory of strategic complements in victimization, hypothesizing that an armed group’s propensity to victimize civilians will increase with its expectation that its competitors will act likewise. We test this argument by structurally estimating a formal model of strategic interdependence between armed groups using data from the Colombian civil war. Our findings indicate that strategic expectations are responsible for a substantial amount of violence against civilians: the two major combatant groups would have systematically victimized civilians in at least 9% fewer municipalities if they had expected no violence by their rival. Examining causal mechanisms, we also find that victimization in the Colombian case was more likely aimed at controlling civilians than at influencing peace negotiations.

意识形态模糊性对恐怖组织的影响

题目：The Impact of Ideological Ambiguity on Terrorist Organizations

作者：Susan Olzak，斯坦福大学社会学荣誉教授，研究兴趣为武装冲突、种族暴力、集体行动和社会运动组织。

摘要：具有清晰目标的组织将获得更大的合法性，从而提高其动员能力。利用恐怖组织的数据，本文探讨了这一主张的两个实证含义：恐怖组织的生存和杀伤力将受到威胁，因为其意识形态的身份是模糊的。本文利用恐怖组织扩展数据(EDTG)的面板数据对1970-2016年观察到的474个全球恐怖组织进行了分析，验证了上述论点。关键的实证预测是，模糊性抑制了杀伤力并减少了存活率。本文在控制了来自对手和盟友的竞争、民族主义或伊斯兰意识形态取向以及其他各种组织能力的衡量标准后，这些主张得到了支持。

Organizations that have a clear and unambiguous focus acquire greater legitimacy, which raises their capacity for mobilization. Using data on terrorist organizations, this paper explores two empirical implications of this claim: A terrorist organization’s survival and lethality will be threatened to the extent that it has an ambiguous ideological identity. Analyses using panel data from the Extended Data on Terrorist Groups (EDTG) test these arguments for 474 global terrorist organizations observed over 1970–2016. The key empirical predictions are that ambiguity inhibits lethality and curtails survival. This paper finds support for these claims, controlling for competition from rivals and allies, ethno-nationalist or Islamic ideological orientation, and a variety of other measures of organizational capacity.

移民对同族政治支持的影响：来自土耳其的证据

题目：The Effect of Migration on Political Support for Co-ethnics: Evidence From Turkey

作者：Miceal Canavan，奥胡斯大学政治系博士后，研究兴趣为当代民主国家的政治暴力、身份认同、群体间关系、接触及冲突遗留物；Oguzhan Turkoglu德国柏林赫蒂学院博士后研究员，研究兴趣为群体间接触、暴力对逃亡的影响、身份、政治态度。

摘要：近年来，因冲突而被迫流离失所或移徙的人数创记录。虽然既定的政治学研究表明，流离失所的社区是冲突的一个额外风险因素，因为他们支持极端的同族政党和运动，但最近的研究表明，移民可以成为一种缓和力量，这一观点受到了挑战。通过区分第一代和第二代移民，本文对这些不同的发现提供了潜在的和解。由于第二代移民相对较少接触冲突，他们对同族裔政党的支持将大大低于第一代移民和留下来的移民。本文使用详细的调查数据来检验该论点，对比了从土耳其冲突地区迁出的库尔德人和留在那里的库尔德人。研究结果支持了本文的理论框架，并对理解移民态度和冲突暴露的长期影响具有重要意义。

In recent years, a record number of people have been forcibly displaced or migrated due to conflict. Whilst established political science research suggests that displaced communities are an added risk factor for conflict due to their support for extreme co-ethnic political parties and movements, this has been challenged by recent research which shows that migrants can be a moderating force. We offer a potential reconciliation of these divergent findings by distinguishing between first- and second-generation migrants. Due to their relative lack of conflict exposure, second-generation migrants will have significantly less support for co-ethnic political parties than first-generation migrants and those who remain. We test our argument using granular survey data comparing Kurds who migrated out of the conflict zone in Turkey with those who remained. The results support our theoretical framework and have important implications for our understanding of migrant attitudes and the long-term effects of conflict exposure.

编译 | 张曼娜

审校 | 周杼樾

排版 | 杨璐蔓

文章来源于《冲突解决杂志》2022年第4期、第5期。文章评译内容为公益分享，服务于学术科研教学工作，不代表国政学人观点。